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Abstract: With the share of renewable energies within the electricity sector rising, im-
proving their market (i.e. inclusion in the allocative processes of the electricity market) 
and system integration (i.e. enhanced responsibility for grid stability) is of increasing 
importance. To transform the energy system efficiently while ensuring security of sup-
ply, it is necessary to increase the alignment of renewable electricity production with 
short- and long-term market signals. By offering plant operators a premium on top of 
the electricity market price, premium schemes represent a potential option for achieving 
this, and have been implemented by several EU member states. This paper focuses on 
the case study of the German market premium scheme, which has been adopted as part 
of the 2012 amendment of the Renewable Energy Sources Act. Building on an evalua-
tion of early experiences, we discuss whether the market premium in its current design 
improves market and/or system integration, and if it seems suitable in principle to con-
tribute to these aims (effectiveness). Also, potential efficiency gains and additional costs 
of “administering integration” are discussed (efficiency). While market integration in a 
narrow sense (i.e. exposing renewables to price risks) is not the purpose of the German 
premium scheme, it has successfully increased participation in direct marketing. How-
ever, windfall profits are high, and the benefits of gradually leading plant operators to-
wards the market are questionable. Incentives for demand-oriented electricity produc-
tion are established, but they prove insufficient particularly in the case of intermittent 
renewable energy sources. It seems therefore unlikely that the German market premium 
scheme in its current form can significantly improve the market and system integration 
of renewable energies. To conclude, we provide an outlook on alternative designs of 
premium schemes, and discuss whether they seem better suited for addressing the chal-
lenges ahead. 
Keywords: Renewable Energies, Market Integration, System Integration, Market Pre-
mium, Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), Efficiency 
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1 Market and system integration of renewable energies as conditions for a  
   successful transformation of the electricity sector 
In recent years, the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in European gross 
electricity consumption has been steadily increasing, from 13.6% in 2005 (452.5 TWh) 
to 19.9% in 2010 (667.8 TWh) (BMU 2012). In order to meet the EU Renewable Ener-
gy Directive’s 20-20-20 target (COM 2009), member states are planning to further up-
scale renewable electricity production – according to National Renewable Energy Ac-
tion Plans, by 2020 RES could reach a share of 34.5% in the EU electricity sector 
(BMU 2012; ECN 2011). Moreover, some member states have set ambitious long-term 
targets. In Germany, for example, the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz, EEG) aims to increase the share of renewable energy sources in elec-
tricity supply to at least 35% by 2020, rising up to 80% by 2050 (sec 1 (2) EEG 2012). 
With this, RES are rapidly outgrowing their status as niche technologies, moving to-
wards becoming the dominant energy technology in the electricity sector in the long 
term (Eclareon & Öko-Institut 2012; Winkler & Altmann 2012). 
However, substituting a centralised energy system based on large-scale, base-load 
power plants for a mix of predominantly small-scale, decentralised renewable energy 
technologies, in which intermittent energy sources like wind and photovoltaics (PV) 
play an important role, poses considerable challenges for the efficiency and security of 
energy supply (BMU 2011; Neubarth 2011; Hiroux & Saguan 2010). To solve these, 
systemic approaches are necessary: apart from substituting fossil (and in the case of 
Germany, nuclear) energies for RES, a successful energy transformation requires in-
vestments in complementary conventional plants, an expansion of grid and storage ca-
pacities, as well as improvements in energy efficiency and energy savings (BMWi & 
BMU 2010). Both for grid stability and the economic efficiency of electricity provision, 
effective short- and long-term market signals to producers are of central importance, as 
they provide incentives for demand-oriented and efficient deployment of existing plant 
capacities as well as for investments in increasing the flexibility of electricity produc-
tion. At the same time, most RES technologies are not yet competitive at current market 
prices and still require public support. 
By offering plant operators a premium on top of the electricity market price, premi-
um schemes represent a potential policy option for aligning renewable electricity pro-
duction with market signals, while providing incentives for RES investment. Conse-
quently, premium schemes have been implemented by several EU member states in re-
cent years (i.e. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain) (RES LEGAL 2012). The design of such schemes 
varies considerably, as do as their importance within national policy mixes for renewa-
ble energy support (cf. Kitzing et al. 2012). This article examines the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the German market premium scheme, which has been adopted as part of 
the 2012 amendment of the Renewable Energy Sources Act.  
In Germany, technology-specific feed-in tariffs guaranteed for 20 years have prov-
en to be a successful instrument for promoting the expansion of renewable energies (cf. 
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Haas et al. 2011; Mitchell et al. 2006; Ragwitz et al. 2007). In 2000, when the Renewa-
ble Energy Sources Act came into force, renewable energy installations produced 
39,181 GWh of electricity, covering 6.8% of gross electricity consumption; in 2011, 
123,186 GWh were produced from RES, providing 20.3% of electricity demand (BMU 
2012). However, in combination with priority purchase and transmission rules, publicly 
administered feed-in tariffs also shield renewable energy producers from both price- and 
quantity-related market signals (Brandstätt et al. 2011; Wustlich & Müller 2011). For 
achieving an efficient mix of energy sources, renewable energies cannot remain perma-
nently detached from competition between alternative technologies. The necessity to 
align investment and production decisions with scarcity signals gives rise to the chal-
lenge of market integration, i.e. the inclusion of RES in the allocative processes of the 
electricity market through an equilibrium electricity price valid for all energy technolo-
gies.1 
Additionally, security of supply considerations require that grid stability is ensured 
at all times. The EEG priority transmission rules, however, exempt RES from the task of 
balancing supply and demand – on the contrary, electricity production which is inde-
pendent from demand and, in the case of wind and solar power, also intermittent, im-
poses additional burdens on grid stability. At the same time, the balancing costs for oth-
er components of the energy system increase, reducing the system’s overall cost effi-
ciency. With the rising share of RES in the energy mix, an increase in regional grid con-
gestions and voltage fluctuations can already be observed, necessitating short-notice 
interventions by Transmission System Operators (TSOs) (which are legally based on sec 
11 EEG and sec 13 (2) EnWG; c.f. Brandstätt et al. 2011; Borggrefe & Nüßler 2009; 
TenneT 2012; 50Hertz 2012). Moreover, particularly in the case of wind power, the co-
incidence of high production levels with low demand can cause negative price spikes at 
the electricity exchange, which can involve significant economic costs (Brandstätt et al. 
2011; Andor et al. 2010; Nicolosi 2010). The rising importance of RES therefore brings 
about the additional challenge of system integration, i.e. renewables must accept re-
sponsibility for grid stability, provide balancing services, and align production with de-
mand to a greater extent.  
Lastly, a fundamental question is how to design the institutional transition from the 
current market introduction regime, which is characterised by administered feed-in tar-
iffs and priority purchase and transmission rules, to a systemically integrated market 
price regime. In 2012, the amendment of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG 
2012) introduced a premium scheme as the central instrument to address these challeng-
es. The aim of the so-called “Marktprämie” (market premium) is to provide market ex-
perience to renewable plant operators and incentives for demand-oriented electricity 
production (Fraunhofer-ISI et al. 2011). At the same time, the former feed-in tariff re-
gime remains in place because most RES technologies have yet to reach grid parity (i.e. 
RES electricity production is more expensive then sourcing electricity from the public 
                                                 
1  The equilibrium electricity price we define as the uniform marginal cost-based price resulting hourly 
at the electricity exchange from the balance between supply and demand.  
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grid). As an optional, i.e. parallel, component for integration, the market premium does 
not aim for a fundamental change in the renewable energy support system, but is in-
tended to promote a smooth transition and prepare the ground for a future transition to a 
market-based regime.  
Building on an evaluation of early experiences, this article examines whether the 
German market premium scheme in its current design improves market and/or system 
integration, and if it seems suitable in principle to contribute to these aims (effective-
ness). Also, potential efficiency gains and additional costs of “administering integra-
tion” are discussed (efficiency). To conclude, we provide an outlook on alternative de-
signs of premium schemes, and discuss whether they seem better suited for addressing 
the challenges ahead. 
 
2 The market premium scheme in the Renewable Energy Sources Act 2012 
2.1 Design of the German market premium scheme 
Since 01.01.2012, when the Renewable Energy Sources Act 2012 (EEG 2012) 
came into force, RES plant operators can choose between receiving a fixed feed-in tariff 
(FIT) and a sliding market premium on a monthly basis (Lehnert 2012; Wustlich & 
Müller 2011). Alternatively, if certain requirements are fulfilled, electricity suppliers can 
directly market RES electricity and benefit from a reduction of their EEG surcharge (i.e. 
the surcharge suppliers pass on to their customers to finance the EEG feed-in tariffs) 
(sec 39 EEG 2012). Also, RES producers can choose to directly market their electricity 
without receiving any reimbursements, although they still benefit from priority trans-
mission and grid access rules (sec 33a et seqq. EEG 2012). Whereas in the FIT scheme, 
TSOs are responsible for selling RES electricity on the spot market (cf. Bundesnet-
zagentur 2010), plant operators choosing the premium scheme or other forms of direct 
marketing have to market their electricity themselves. In the market premium scheme, 
producers are paid the difference between the feed-in tariff a plant would be entitled to 
and the average market value of the electricity generated. Moreover, they receive a 
management premium intended to cover additional costs resulting from their direct par-
ticipation in the market, e.g. balancing costs incurred when actual production deviates 
from forecasts, and costs for handling market transactions (EEG 2012 annex 4 no. 1; 
Sensfuß & Ragwitz 2011; Lehnert 2012; Wustlich & Müller 2011; see fig. 1): 
 
MPRGross = FIT – MV + MMP 
 
  
MPRNet
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Where  
MPRGross:  total premium in the market premium scheme (“gross premium”) 
FIT:  technology-specific feed-in tariff a plant could claim according to 
sec 16 EEG 2012 
MV:  actual monthly average of the relative (= technology-adjusted) 
market value 
MMP:   technology-specific management premium 
MPRNet:  compensation for the difference between market value and feed-in 
tariff (“net premium”).  
 
Fig. 1 Overview of the German market premium scheme 
 
Source: own illustration, based on Lehnert 2012; Wustlich & Müller 2011; EEG 2012 annex 4 no. 1 
 
The average market value is calculated monthly ex post based on hourly prices at 
the electricity stock exchange EEX (EEG 2012 annex 4 no. 2; Sensfuß & Ragwitz 
2011). For dispatchable, non-intermittent RES, the market value equals the actual 
monthly arithmetic average of hourly contracts on the spot market (EEG 2012 annex 4 
no. 2.1). For wind and photovoltaics, a technology-specific “relative” market value is 
used instead (EEG 2012 annex 4 no. 2.2 et seqq.), because wind is frequently produced 
at times when demand and electricity prices are low, while the production of solar pow-
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er tends to peak around noon, when prices are high.2 As a result, wind energy tends to 
have a lower market value compared to dispatchable RES, while solar power has a 
higher relative market value (Sensfuß & Ragwitz 2011; Lehnert 2012). The manage-
ment premium also distinguishes between dispatchable and intermittent RES; to account 
for the costs of balancing forecasting errors, the latter receive significantly higher pre-
miums (Sensfuß & Ragwitz 2011). For 2012, the management premium for wind and 
PV amounts to 12€/MWh, while dispatchable RES receive 3€/MWh (EEG 2012 annex 
4 no. 2.2 et seqq.). However, management premium rates are subject to a pronounced 
yearly decrease, which, in the case of wind and solar power, has been tightened even 
further through the Management Premium Ordinance (MaPrV) enacted at 29.08.2012 
(see tab. 1). 
 
Tab. 1 Management premium rates according to EEG 2012, annex 4 no. 2.1 et seqq., 
and MaPrV 2012 
Year Dispatchable 
RES 
Wind / PV 
according to 
EEG 2012 (old) 
Wind / PV according to MaPrV, 
29.08.2012 (new) 
Plants whose out-
put can be remote 
controlled 
Other plants 
2012 0,30 ct/kWh 1,20 ct/kWh 
2013 0,275 ct/kWh 1,00 ct/kWh 0,75 ct/kWh 0,65 ct/kWh 
2014 0,25 ct/kWh 0,85 ct/kWh 0,60 ct/kWh 0,45 ct/kWh 
From 2015 0,225 ct/kWh 0,70 ct/kWh 0,50 ct/kWh 0,30 ct/kWh 
Source: own compilation 
 
The total premium paid according to the market premium scheme (MPS), i.e. the 
“gross” market premium, therefore consists of the sliding “net” market premium 
(MPRNet), defined as the difference between technology-specific feed-in tariff and the 
actual monthly average of the technology-specific market value, and the management 
premium (MMP). 
Additionally, the market premium scheme is complemented by several measures in-
tended to improve the framework conditions for the market and system integration of 
RES (cf. Gawel & Purkus 2013). For example, participation of RES and storage sys-
tems in balancing markets has been facilitated (Bundesnetzagentur 2012), and electrici-
ty from new storage installations has been temporarily exempted from grid charges (sec 
118 (6) EnWG 2011). Also, for biogas plants using the market premium scheme, a flex-
ibility premium offers additional incentives by compensating for investment costs in 
                                                 
2  The relative market value of wind and PV is calculated by dividing the sum of average hourly sales 
revenues of wind or PV at the electricity exchange by the amount of wind or PV power produced in 
that month (Sensfuß & Ragwitz 2011; EEG 2012, annex 4 no. 2.2 et seqq.). 
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additional storage and production capacities required for a more flexible electricity gen-
eration (sec 33i EEG). 
 
2.2 Objectives of the German market premium scheme 
In order to analyse the effectiveness of the German market premium, it seems use-
ful to distinguish between three basic objectives which can in principle be pursued 
through premium schemes: 
 Market integration (in a narrow sense): By aligning reimbursements for RES pro-
duction with the average market price level, a premium scheme can increase the ex-
posure of market participants to price risks (Eclareon & Öko-Institut 2012). In such 
a scheme, the revenues of producers would in principle be determined by the elec-
tricity market.  
 System integration: Furthermore, a premium scheme can contribute to the manage-
ment of balancing risks in the electricity system, by providing RES producers with 
incentives to supply balancing power and ancillary services (Eclareon & Öko-
Institut 2012). 
 Direct marketing: Finally, a premium scheme can incentivise a change of distribu-
tion channels, to increase the direct participation of RES plant operators in the elec-
tricity market. From an economic perspective, however, this does not constitute an 
end in itself (Knopp et al. 2012), but serves the objectives of improving market and 
system integration. 
To improve the market integration of RES, the German market premium scheme is 
meant to provide plant operators with incentives to evolve from “passive participants to 
active market actors” (Fraunhofer-ISI et al. 2011, p. 13, own translation). By switching 
from feed-in tariffs to direct marketing, producers may gather experience with market 
operations, while at the same time a stronger alignment of production decisions with 
market prices is encouraged. By selling electricity when demand – and therefore the 
market price – is high, producers can earn revenues above the average market values 
used in calculating the market premium, thereby improving their income relative to the 
fixed feed-in tariff (BMU 2011; Lehnert 2012). By providing the chance of higher reve-
nues, the net market premium therefore provides incentives for changing distribution 
channels. The management premium, meanwhile, is intended to compensate for the cost 
risks of direct marketing, i.e. the comparative transaction costs of participating in direct 
marketing. 
The possibility of earning higher revenues by shifting electricity generation to 
hours with high demand or low supply is also meant to incentivise demand-oriented 
electricity production, which would improve the system integration of RES (BMU 
2011; Neubarth 2011). Here, the objective is not merely to increase participation in di-
rect marketing, but to realise changes in production behaviour, which are relevant for 
the system’s efficiency (incentives for changing production behaviour). According to 
estimates by Consentec and R2B Energy Consulting (2010), such changes in RES pro-
duction behaviour could save 425 million € in 2015 in the conventional energy system, 
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or 670 million € in 2020 (discounted values, base year 2010). In these estimates, cost 
savings are mainly realised through changed production patterns of dispatchable RES. 
For intermittent RES, increasing the flexibility of electricity supply would require ex-
tensive investments in storage systems (Consentec & R2B Energy Consulting 2010). 
While this led to debates about their inclusion in the premium scheme (cf. Fraunhofer-
ISI et al. 2011, Votum IWES, S. 182), the net market premium is intended to encourage 
wind and PV plant operators to at least explore short-term options for providing balanc-
ing power (e.g. participation in balancing markets, voluntary curtailment in response to 
negative power prices, or the alignment of maintenance planning with low-demand 
hours) (Fraunhofer-ISI et al. 2011). Moreover, in the mid-term, the market premium 
scheme should provide incentives for more flexible plant designs and the development 
of energy storage systems (Fraunhofer-ISI et al. 2011). Also, the scheme is expected to 
improve the quality of forecasts of feed-in quantities, as the exchange of information 
between plant operators and marketing actors is more direct than in the FIT (Möhrlen et 
al. 2012), and to reduce costs for balancing forecasting errors, which producers in direct 
marketing have to bear themselves (Sensfuß & Ragwitz 2009; Consentec & R2B Ener-
gy Consulting 2010). However, though an increased demand-orientation of RES pro-
duction is encouraged, priority transmission rules remain intact for RES plants partici-
pating in direct marketing (sec 8 and 9 et seqq. EEG 2012; Schumacher 2012; Wustlich 
& Müller 2011), as well as rules pertaining to the priority connection of RES plants to 
the grid (sec 5 et seqq. EEG 2012; Wustlich & Müller 2011).3 Consequently, RES pro-
ducers in the premium scheme remain relatively shielded from balancing and volume 
risks (cf. Eclareon & Öko-Institut 2012).  
Increasing the market integration of RES in a narrow sense, meanwhile, is not the 
aim of the German market premium scheme. In its current design, the net market premi-
um eliminates the general price risk almost completely, by covering the difference be-
tween average market prices and feed-in tariff rates (Nestle 2011). As such, decisions 
about the mix of energy sources employed remain directed by publicly administered 
feed-in compensation, as opposed to market forces. Exposing plant operators to an in-
creased market price risk is explicitly not the market premium scheme’s intention, be-
cause this would diminish planning certainty and decrease the willingness to invest in 
RES (cf. Sensfuß & Ragwitz 2009). Therefore, the following discussion can be limited 
to the aspects of direct marketing and system integration. 
 
                                                 
3  If RES plants in the market premium scheme are forced to reduce output as a consequence of feed-in 
management measures (sec11 EEG 2012), they are entitled to compensation for lost revenues, same as 
plants in the FIT scheme (sec 12 (1) EEG 2012; Schumacher 2012). 
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3 The performance of the German market premium scheme  
   – an evaluation of early experiences 
3.1 Use of the scheme 
After the first year of its implementation, the market premium scheme has been 
successfully established as an alternative to the EEG feed-in tariffs (figures 2 and 3). In 
particular, the degree to which wind power plants use the premium scheme is consider-
ably higher than initially expected (50Hertz et al. 2011). Also, an increasing number of 
bioenergy plants changed to the market premium regime: while in January 2012 933 
MW of installed capacity chose this form of direct marketing, this number rose to 1963 
MW in December (EEG-KWK-G 2012a), which is equivalent to about a third of the 
total installed biomass capacity of 2011 (cf. BMU 2012). While data for the installed 
capacity in the market premium scheme is available on a monthly basis, this is not yet 
the case for data about quantities of electricity produced. However, based on forecasts 
of average monthly full load hours for 2012, estimates are possible (cf. IE Leipzig 2011; 
50Hertz et al. 2011). According to these, an estimated 65% of all on- and offshore wind 
power production between January and October 2012 was reimbursed according to the 
market premium scheme (cf. fig.  4). For bioenergy plants the premium scheme’s share 
was smaller, but still significant, amounting to an estimated 26% (cf. fig. 4). For PV 
installations the feed-in tariff remains the dominant support instrument – only about 3% 
of the plants have been using the premium scheme; as the small, decentralised scale of 
production results in high transaction costs when electricity is marketed directly, this 
finding is hardly surprising. For landfill, sewage treatment and mine gases, direct mar-
keting aiming for a EEG surcharge reduction is more important than the premium 
scheme (cf. fig. 4; EEG-KWK-G 2012a). Likewise, water power plants use the premium 
scheme only to a limited extent (in 2012, an average of 400MW of installed water pow-
er capacity used the scheme each month, which is equal to about 9% of the installed 
capacity at the end of 2011), while it is not relevant at all for geothermal power plants 
(fig 2; EEG-KWK-G 2012a; BMU 2012). 
Compared to 2011, the market premium scheme significantly increased participa-
tion in direct marketing – in particular, direct marketing was strengthened considerably 
for the wind, PV and biomass technology groups (cf. EEG-KWK-G 2012a). At the same 
time, direct marketing for reducing the EEG surcharge according to sec 39 EEG has 
become less relevant (cf. EEG-KWK-G 2012a), as eligibility requirements have been 
tightened and achievable benefits reduced (Hummel 2012; Lehnert 2012).  
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Fig. 2 Usage of the market premium scheme by technology group  
          (January-December 2012, installed capacity in megawatts) 
 
Note: “others” encompass geothermal power, landfill gas, sewage treatment gas and mine gas 
Source: own illustration, based on EEG-KWK-G 2012a 
 
Fig. 3 Share of electricity production compensated by the market premium scheme  
          in total RES electricity production (January-December 2012, in per cent) 
 
Note: “wind” includes onshore and offshore wind power, “others” include water power and landfill gas, 
sewage treatment gas and mine gas 
Source: own illustration, based on data about RES electricity in the FIT scheme marketed by the TSOs 
(EEG-KWK-G 2012b), and estimates of directly marketed electricity amounts, using data about installed 
capacities (EEG-KWK 2012a) and forecasts for monthly average full load hours in 2012 (IE Leipzig 
2011) 
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Fig. 4 Shares of different direct marketing options in RES electricity production  
          (January-October 2012, in per cent) 
 
Source: own illustration, based on own estimates of directly marketed electricity amounts (cf. EEG-KWK 
2012a; EEG-KWK-G 2012b; IE Leipzig 2011) 
 
3.2 Effectiveness of the German market premium scheme 
The market premium scheme can be considered effective if it increases participa-
tion in direct marketing (3.2.1), and improves the system integration of RES (3.2.2). 
 
3.2.1 Impacts on participation in direct marketing  
        (incentives for changing distribution channels) 
Mainly, the market premium scheme supports the market integration of RES by en-
couraging producers to gain experiences with market processes by participating in direct 
marketing. In this way, it is intended to facilitate a future transition towards a market 
regime (cf. Sensfuß & Ragwitz 2009; Consentec & R2B Energy Consulting 2010). Giv-
en that the market premium scheme has caused a significantly higher number of plant 
operators to choose direct marketing than in previous years, it can be considered effec-
tive in this regard (Kopp et al. 2012; cf. also EEG/KWK-G 2012a). However, while the 
main incentive for changing distribution channels should be the possibility of realising 
higher profits through demand-oriented production and intelligent marketing (cf. BMU 
2011, section 2), it is to be expected that the management premium plays an important 
role in the successful uptake of the premium scheme. While additional profits from 
price-oriented direct marketing are subject to market risks, the management premium 
represents a certain additional income, as long as it surpasses the actual costs of chang-
ing the distribution channel (cf. section 3.3). 
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Meanwhile, when directly participating in electricity and balancing markets, large-
scale RES producers and electricity utilities can benefit from increasing returns to scale 
and existing market experience. As a result, they may have a competitive advantage 
compared to small-scale producers, causing concerns that the market premium scheme 
could promote concentration processes in the RES sector (Nestle 2011). While this 
question merits further empirical analysis, the premium scheme has initiated the devel-
opment of business models which also handle direct marketing activities for small RES 
producers (cf. e.g. Statkraft 2012; Uken 2012). 
 
3.2.2 Impacts on system integration (incentives for changing production behaviour) 
Although RES producers remain shielded from general market price risks, the mar-
ket premium scheme does set incentives to react to short-term price signals (cf. section 
2.2). For evaluating the scheme’s impacts on system integration, it is necessary to dis-
cuss whether these incentives are effective in promoting demand-oriented electricity 
production. For this purpose, a fundamental distinction has to be made between incen-
tives for a short-term adaptation of production decisions and long-term investments in 
energy storage systems and flexible RES plant design. Given that the inclusion of wind 
power and PV was debated prior to the market premium scheme’s implementation, the 
effects on the system integration of intermittent RES are discussed first.  
To date, for wind power and PV installations curtailment remains the main option 
for steering their feed-in of electricity into the grid (Brandstätt et al. 2011). For more 
comprehensive investments in flexible plant design and storage systems, which are still 
at an early stage of technological development, the incentives offered by the market 
premium scheme are considered to be insufficient (Fraunhofer-ISI et al. 2011, Vote 
IWES, p. 148; Nestle 2011; Dietrich & Ahnsehl 2012). 
Meanwhile, plant operators only receive the market premium for the amount of 
electricity they actually sell; in the absence of storage options, electricity production is 
therefore profitable as long as the market price is higher than the plant’s marginal costs 
minus the amount of the gross market premium which the producer expects to receive 
(Andor et al. 2010; Klessmann et al. 2008; cf. tab. 2). Since the marginal costs of wind 
and solar power production approach zero, this means that for intermittent RES, elec-
tricity production remains profitable even if market prices are negative. Moreover, plant 
operators do not have to bear balancing risks; if they are forced to reduce their output in 
order to ensure grid stability, they are entitled to compensation (Schumacher 2012; 
Wustlich & Müller 2011; sec 12 (1) EEG 2012). As a result, the behavioural incentives 
of the market premium scheme will only encourage voluntarily curtailment, when the 
surplus of electricity on spot markets becomes so great that sellers have to offer buyers 
a larger amount than the gross market premium (i.e. net market premium plus manage-
ment premium) they expect to receive.4 If this is the case, the market premium scheme 
                                                 
4  Notwithstanding, the market premium scheme sets incentives for shifting maintenance activities and 
other unavoidable ouput reductions to hours with low or negative electricity prices (cf. Fraunhofer-ISI 
et al. 2011). 
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improves economic efficiency compared to a feed-in tariff system, where production is 
completely detached from market price developments. From an economic perspective, 
however, production would only make sense if market prices at least covered marginal 
production costs, that is if market prices were positive in the case of RES with marginal 
costs close to zero (see tab. 2).  
 
Tab. 2 Operational profitability and economic efficiency of RES production, depending 
on market prices (P), marginal costs of production (MC), and the expected value of the 
gross market premium (E{MPRGross}) 
 Production is profitable for plant 
operators, if  
Production is economically effi-
cient, if 
EEG market premium 
scheme 
P  MC – E{MPRGross} 
For MC = 0: 
P  – E{MPRGross}
P  MC 
For MC = 0: 
P  0 
EEG feed-in tariff P  ℝ 
Source: own compilation, based on Andor et al. 2010 
 
Consequently, the market premium scheme only sets effective incentives for de-
mand-oriented production when electricity market prices are highly negative, i.e. small-
er than the negative expected value of the gross market premium. To assess the rele-
vance of this effect, an examination of the frequency and magnitude of negative price 
events in the spot market of the European Electricity Exchange (EEX) is informative 
(see fig. 5). In 2011, negative prices occurred in 15 hours of the year, affecting a total of 
464.2 GWh. In 2012, prices were negative in 23 hours (until November), affecting 
747.4 GWh. However, slightly negative prices between 0 €/MWh and -1 €/MWh are the 
most frequent category, whereas prices below -10 €/MWh only occurred in three (2011) 
and five (2012) hours respectively (at the same time, the management premium for wind 
and PV alone amounts to 12€/MWh). As a result, plant operators of RES with marginal 
costs close to zero would only be incentivised to forego production in a very limited 
number of hours in a year. Windfall profits in connection with the management premi-
um lead to additional distortions of price signals for demand-oriented electricity genera-
tion (see section 3.3). For intermittent RES, it seems therefore unlikely that the market 
premium scheme will cause a significant shift in production patterns towards a stronger 
demand-orientation.  
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Fig. 5 Negative electricity prices on the EPEX spot market, 01.01.2011-30.11.2012 
 
Source: own illustration, based on EPEX Spot 2012 
 
Furthermore, up to now the market premium scheme has not been able to break the 
trend towards an increasing number of congestion management measures TSOs have to 
take in order to safeguard grid stability (according to sec 11 EEG 2012 and sec 13 (2) 
EnWG, see fig. 6). Several factors are relevant in explaining the rising number of inter-
ventions, such as the growing share of intermittent RES in total electricity production 
and the increasing regional divergence of electricity supply and demand (cf. Borggrefe 
& Nüßler 2009). An estimation of the influence of individual factors and potentially 
positive effects of the premium scheme on grid stability is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. However, the continuing increase in the number of congestion management 
measures demonstrates that the market premium scheme as the primary instrument for 
supporting RES system integration is clearly not sufficient.   
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Fig. 6 Congestion management measures according to sec 11 EEG in the control areas  
         of the TSOs 50Hertz and TenneT (January 2010-November 2012)5 
 
Source: own illustration, based on 50Hertz 2012; TenneT 2012 
 
In the case of dispatchable RES like bioenergy, water power, and landfill, sewage 
treatment and mine gases, the market premium scheme can effectively support system 
integration if a switch towards flexible electricity production can be implemented with 
relatively little effort (Consentec & R2B Energy Consulting 2010). For bioenergy plants 
in particular, the market premium scheme provides higher incentives than for wind and 
PV installations, because producers incur variable costs for energy carriers. With mar-
ginal costs above zero, bioenergy plant operators would therefore have a higher willing-
ness to voluntarily curtail output when electricity prices are low; moreover, the combus-
tion of bioenergy carriers can be shifted to hours with higher prices. However, even for 
biogas plants the incentives set by the market premium scheme have been shown to be 
too low to encourage necessary investments in flexible plant designs (Fraunhofer-IWES 
et al. 2011). Unlike with other technologies, for biogas plants the flexibility premium 
has been created to fill this gap (sec 33i EEG 2012; Fraunhofer-IWES et al. 2011). 
Meanwhile, to confirm if the incentives provided by market premium and flexibility 
premium in combination are sufficient to encourage investments in flexible plant de-
signs, empirical studies are necessary.  
 
                                                 
5  The control areas of the TSOs 50Hertz and Tennet cover Northern and Eastern Germany and include 
the entire coastline (Netzentwicklungsplan 2012); as a result, the system integration of intermittent 
RES is particularly challenging for these control areas. In the control areas of the remaining TSOs 
TransnetBW and Amprion no interventions according to sec 11 EEG 2012 have been necessary yet (as 
of August 2012, personal communication). 
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3.3 Efficiency of the German market premium scheme 
A central criterion for evaluating the market premium scheme is whether it suc-
ceeds in improving the economic efficiency of RES electricity supply. Given that tech-
nology-specific feed-in tariffs remain the basis for the calculation of the net market 
premium, the scheme does not lead to a reduction in average electricity generation costs 
(see section 2.2). However, it would contribute to efficiency improvements, if 
1. the electricity system’s grid stabilisation and balancing costs were reduced 
2. the additional costs necessary for administering the scheme did not overcompen-
sate these savings.  
 
3.3.1 Additional costs 
Additional costs arise for the organisation of direct marketing activities and the 
administration of the market premium scheme, which exists in parallel with the FIT 
scheme’s distribution channels. No data is available yet about the transactions costs to 
grid operators of processing premium calculations and payments. With regard to pro-
ducers’ handling costs of direct marketing, which are compensated by the management 
premium, the existence of windfall profits has been criticised since shortly after the 
scheme’s introduction (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2012; IZES 2012). Based on rec-
ommendations from Fraunhofer-ISI et al. (2012), the management premium ordinance 
(MaPrV, adopted 29.08.2012) significantly lowered management premium rates for in-
termittent RES in 2013 and the following years, and introduced a distinction between 
wind and PV plants according to remote control possibilities (cf. tab. 1). 
However, this adjustment of premium rates does not stop plant operators from ob-
taining windfall profits by claiming the market premium because of its high manage-
ment premium, without significantly changing their production behaviour (IZES 2012). 
Because of the strong degression in the management premium’s design, it can be profit-
able for producers to change back into the feed-in tariff scheme in the mid-term, placing 
doubts on the permanence of market and system integration effects (IZES 2012). While 
problematic, this effect is difficult to mitigate; at least in its implementation phase, the 
market premium scheme has to offer plant operators additional income possibilities, to 
incentivise a change of distribution channels (see section 2).  
Overall, additional costs of the market premium in comparison with the feed-in tar-
iff scheme are primarily caused by the management premium (cf. BMU 2011; Sensfuß 
& Ragwitz 2011; see section 2). Based on data on installed capacities using the market 
premium scheme (see fig. 2) and estimates of the corresponding quantities of electricity 
produced, an assessment of these costs is possible (see tab. 3). For 2012, total manage-
ment premium costs can be estimated to amount to 460 Mio. € (cf. also Nick-Leptin 
2012; Hummel 2012). These were predominantly caused by wind power plants partici-
pating in the premium scheme (89% of the costs), followed by biomass (6% of the 
costs) (cf. tab. 3). Initial calculations prior to the instrument’s implementation assumed 
management premium costs of only 200 Mio. €/a; however, usage of the market premi-
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um scheme has been higher than expected (Nick-Leptin 2012; Sensfuß & Ragwitz 
2011).  
 
Tab. 3 Estimation of management premium costs in 2012 in € 
RES Estimated management 
premium costs 2012 
Share of total costs  
[%] 
Water 4,857,546 1.06
Landfill gas, sewage treatment gas and mine gas 358,881 0.08
Biomass 26,882,997 5.84
Geothermal 0 0.00
Wind onshore 408,158,268 88.65
Wind offshore 9,555,972 2.08
Photovoltaics 10,599,016 2.30
Sum 460,412,680 100
Source: based on management premium rates for 2012 (EEG 2012 annex 4, no. 2.1 et seqq.), and an esti-
mation of electricity quantities reimbursed by the market premium (own calculations, based on installed 
capacities participating in the market premium scheme (EEG-KWK 2012a) and 2012 forecasts of month-
ly average full load hours (IE Leipzig 2011)) 
 
Additionally, long-term savings could result from preparing market participants for 
a future change in the RES support regime towards stronger market orientation. Howev-
er, it seems questionable if market experience gained by participation in direct market-
ing and respective learning effects can justify the instrument’s additional costs (Con-
sentec & R2B Energy Consulting 2010; IZES 2012). Moreover, if the market premium 
scheme is seen as a means to acquaint RES plant operators with market processes, this 
assumes that increasing the share of direct marketing now will save future costs of a 
system change. The fast, large-scale uptake of the market premium scheme (see section 
3.1) demonstrates that RES producers are well able to react rapidly to changing frame-
work conditions, moving from fixed feed-in tariffs to a direct participation in market 
processes within a short time (Kopp et al. 2012). Whereas in December 2011 a total 
installed capacity of 3563 MW was using direct marketing channels (predominantly for 
reducing the EEG surcharge), 14,666 MW were doing so in January 2012 (92% of 
which were claiming the market premium) (EEG/KWK-G 2012a, Wassermann et al. 
2012). It appears that many RES actors can make use of existing experiences, trade 
connections and organisational structures in rapidly expanding direct marketing activi-
ties (cf. Wassermann et al. 2012). Consequently, the benefits of a gradual familiarisation 
with market distribution channels can be questioned, given that the emergence of mar-
ket institutions and the adaptation to new framework conditions seems to be working 
well within the RES sector.  
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3.3.2 Impacts on grid stabilisation and balancing costs 
The main benefit of the market premium, meanwhile, was intended to be the crea-
tion of “more flexibility in the overall system” (BMU 2011, p. 15, own translation), 
leading to a decrease in balancing and grid stabilisation costs. Therefore, for an evalua-
tion of the market premium scheme, it is of central importance what efficiency gains 
could in fact be realised through market premium-induced, demand-oriented electricity 
production. To answer this question, in-depth empirical research or modelling efforts are 
required. In particular, it is necessary to analyse if the scheme’s system benefits are pri-
marily provided by dispatchable RES, as predicted by Consentec & R2B Energy Con-
sulting (2010). In the case of dispatchable RES, where production can be aligned with 
demand with relative ease, and where management premium rates are consequentially 
low, it seems probable that the market premium scheme can indeed bring about savings 
in the overall system. However, the costs of the flexibility premium for biogas plants 
would also have to be taken into account. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the 
market premium will cause significant changes in the production behaviour of intermit-
tent RES, because output reductions are only profitable when electricity prices are 
strongly negative (see section 3.2.2). At the same time, intermittent RES drive the addi-
tional costs of the market premium scheme – in total, 93% of the management premium 
costs are accounted for by onshore and offshore wind power and PV (cf. tab. 3). The 
adjustments implemented in the management premium ordinance (MaPrV 2012) will 
undoubtedly decrease the future costs of including intermittent RES in the scheme – for 
2013, savings of 160 Mio. € are expected, increasing to 200 Mio. € in 2015 due to the 
premium’s degressive design (Fraunhofer-ISI et al. 2012). However, given the manage-
ment premium’s role of setting incentives for changing distribution channels, this meas-
ure will also reduce the scheme’s attractiveness for wind and PV plants. Moreover, un-
certainties about further adjustments in the future (cf. MaPrV 2012, annex 2) can be 
expected to further decrease the willingness to invest in demand-oriented production 
measures beyond merely a curtailment or maintenance planning. Under these condi-
tions, it seems highly doubtful if the inclusion of intermittent RES can result in a signif-
icant decrease of grid stabilisation or balancing costs (cf. Hummel 2012).  
Overall it seems unlikely that the market premium scheme in its current design sig-
nificantly improves the efficiency of RES electricity supply. On the contrary, at least in 
the short term, it increases the costs of public support (BMU 2011; Consentec & R2B 
Energy Consulting 2010). For reaching a conclusion about the instrument’s efficiency, 
the central question is whether savings generated by an improved system integration of 
RES are not overcompensated by the additional costs of the scheme, which are mainly 
caused by the management premium. Further research is necessary to quantify system 
integration benefits. While for dispatchable RES efficiency gains seem plausible, a posi-
tive cost-benefit balance seems less likely in the case of wind power and PV. Given the 
low effectiveness of the market premium scheme in providing intermittent RES with 
incentives for demand-oriented production, and their high share in the instrument’s ad-
ditional costs, a re-evaluation of their inclusion in the scheme is recommendable.  
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4 The market premium scheme’s impacts on market and system integration  
    of RES – taking stock 
4.1 The market premium scheme in the EEG 2012 
As demonstrated, it seems useful to distinguish between the different economic ob-
jectives of a premium scheme: market integration in a narrow sense (i.e. increasing the 
alignment of production with market prices); system integration (i.e. improving the re-
sponsibility of RES for balancing and grid stabilisation, by linking revenues to spot 
market prices); and the utilisation of direct marketing as a distribution channel, which is 
not an end in itself, but supports the other two objectives.  
Against this background, conclusions concerning the market premium scheme as 
implemented in the EEG 2012 are divided:  
1. Market integration in a narrow sense, i.e. letting market prices determine the 
electricity mix and guide investments, is not the objective of the solely optional market 
premium scheme. This is convincing, because an increase in the general price risk for 
RES would lead to significantly higher investment risks, thereby jeopardising the reali-
sation of ambitious RES expansion targets.  
2. Incentives for changing distribution channels are primarily set by the manage-
ment premium, despite its intended role as compensation for higher transaction costs. 
These incentives are effective, but currently high windfall profits result from overly 
generous management premium rates; the necessity for corrective interventions, in turn, 
imposes uncertainties on market actors. As windfall profits are likely to be a major ex-
planatory factor for the high uptake of the market premium scheme, the permanence of 
its effects on participation in direct marketing may be questioned. While increasing the 
degression rate of the management premium limits the scope for future windfall profits, 
it also lowers the attractiveness of the market premium scheme, resulting in a trade-off 
between effectiveness and efficiency. Given that the use of direct marketing does not 
constitute an end in itself, a central question is what additional benefits arise from a 
gradual familiarisation with market processes. The fast uptake of the scheme shows that 
the market is apparently able to evolve necessary institutions quite rapidly, making the 
benefits of a gradual, long-term learning process questionable. Markets and market ac-
tors react almost instantaneously to changes in framework conditions (cf. Kopp et al. 
2012), which means that they would also do so at a later stage, once RES had actually 
reached grid parity and technological maturity.  
3. The market premium scheme does set incentives for an improved system integra-
tion of RES: producers who adapt their feed-in profile to short-term market price signals 
can increase their revenue compared to receiving a fixed feed-in tariff, and contribute 
towards improved grid stability in the process. However, in the case of intermittent 
RES, these incentives are not sufficient to bring about a significant increase in flexibil-
ity of production beyond economically plausible reactions to relatively rare negative 
price spikes. Moreover, incentives are not strong enough to encourage investments in 
storage systems or flexible plant designs. Accordingly, a significant contribution to-
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wards solving the urgent problem of integrating intermittent RES into the electricity 
system is not to be expected.  
Overall, the market premium scheme as implemented in the EEG 2012 does not 
seem promising: in its current design, the instrument is neither effective nor efficient in 
promoting market and system integration. The scheme shifts RES production towards 
direct marketing, but a significant change in production behaviour is not to be expected; 
also, additional costs ensue, which are mainly driven by windfall profits. The market 
premium scheme may, however, set effective incentives for dispatchable RES when 
flexible load management is possible at low costs, as well as for biogas plants in combi-
nation with the flexibility premium; this remains to be confirmed empirically. For in-
termittent RES, which are responsible for a high share of the additional costs, windfall 
profits are likely to dominate. Long-term benefits from a gradual familiarisation with 
market distribution channels seem negligible; on the contrary, the inevitability of further 
corrective interventions may entail additional transaction costs due to political uncer-
tainty.  
 
4.2 Alternative design options for premium schemes 
Meanwhile, the design of the market premium scheme in the EEG 2012 represents 
only one possible option; other variants have been implemented in other EU member 
states (Eclareon & Öko-Institut 2012; RES-LEGAL 2012). The role of premium 
schemes in overall RES support varies (cf. RES-LEGAL 2012). Germany and Spain are 
examples where the premium scheme exists alongside a comprehensive FIT system, and 
plant operators can choose regularly between the two schemes (annually in the case of 
Spain, and monthly in the case of Germany; the Spanish scheme, however, is currently 
closed for new entrants) (Klein et al. 2010; RES-LEGAL 2012). In Italy, the premium 
scheme co-exists with feed-in tariffs and a tender system, but depending on RES source 
and installation size producers may be restricted to a certain system (RES-LEGAL 
2012). In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the premium scheme constitutes the main 
RES support instrument (Kitzing et al. 2012). Table 4 provides an overview of the dif-
ferent premium schemes that have been implemented in EU member states. A short 
overview of basic design options is followed by a discussion whether other variants 
might be better suited to promote market and system integration of RES than the Ger-
man market premium scheme.  
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Tab. 4 Overview of premium schemes in EU member states  
Type of 
premium 
scheme 
Country Premium design Adjustment  
of premium rates 
Fixed 
premium 
schemes 
Denmark Technology-specific bonus on top of the market price 
Generally, bonus payments are capped so that a max-
imum level set for the sum of market price and bonus 
is not exceeded; in certain cases, no maximum limit 
applies 
Generally, adjustments 
require amendments in 
regulation; for some tech-
nologies, annual adjust-
ments apply 
Czech Re-
public 
Technology-specific “green bonus” on top of the 
market price 
Bonuses for new plants 
are determined annually; 
for existing plants bonuses 
increase annually with the 
industrial production in-
dex 
Estonia Fixed bonus on top of the market price, which is 
generally the same for all technologies 
By regulatory amendment 
only 
Netherlands Technology-specific premium on top of the market 
price 
Premium payments are allocated in several stages 
throughout the year; the premium increases with each 
stage, but as the total annual budget is capped, appli-
cants for the later stages may not receive any support 
Premium levels and the 
total available budget are 
determined annually 
Sliding 
premium 
schemes 
Cyprus Premium payments cover the difference between a 
technology-specific, guaranteed tariff and market 
prices 
The premium scheme 
expired on 31.10.2012 
Finland Premium payments cover the difference between a 
fixed, technology-specific target price and the aver-
age market price of the previous three months. Target 
prices are reduced by 30€, if the market price falls 
below 30 € per MWh 
Quarterly; adjustment of 
target prices requires regu-
latory amendments 
Germany Premium payments cover the difference between 
technology-specific feed-in tariffs and the actual 
monthly average of the technology-specific market 
value, plus a management premium 
Monthly; adjustment of 
feed-in tariffs requires 
regulatory amendments 
Italy Premium payments cover the difference between 
fixed, technology-specific feed-in tariffs and zonal 
hourly market prices, plus further premiums or bo-
nuses that may be granted to a plant 
Hourly; adjustment of 
feed-in tariffs requires 
regulatory amendments 
Slovenia  Premium payments cover the difference between 
technology-specific reference costs and reference 
market prices of electricity, which are multiplied by a 
technology-specific adjustment factor. 
Annual adjustment of 
reference costs and fore-
cast reference market 
prices  
Inter-
mediate 
models 
Spain Premium payments depend on hourly electricity 
market prices: plant operators receive a floor price, if 
prices are low; the market price plus a fixed premium 
for price levels between the floor and the cap; no 
premium, if prices are higher than the cap. 
As of January 2012, both 
premium and feed-in tariff 
schemes have been sus-
pended (no new plants can 
enter the scheme) 
Sources: based on RES-LEGAL 2012; Eclareon & Öko-Institut 2012 
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4.2.1 Design characteristics of premium schemes 
In general, a distinction can be made between schemes with a fixed and a sliding 
premium (cf. Kitzing et al. 2012). In fixed premium schemes, which have been imple-
mented for example by Denmark and Estonia, plant operators receive a fixed bonus on 
top of the market price (Eclareon & Öko-Institut 2012); in the case of Denmark, the 
total sum of market prices and premium payments is capped for some technology 
groups (RES LEGAL 2012; Klein et al. 2010). Whereas in fixed premium schemes, 
revisions of premium rates generally require amendments in regulation, sliding premi-
um schemes adjust regularly to take market developments into account. In Finland, 
Germany, Italy and Slovenia, premium payments adjust to cover the difference between 
a pre-determined target price or feed-in tariff and average market prices (RES LEGAL 
2012; Klein et al. 2010). An intermediate model between fixed and sliding premium 
schemes has been implemented by Spain. Here, the premium adjusts hourly to guaran-
tee at least a floor price. Between floor and a certain cap, a fixed premium is paid; if 
market prices are approaching the cap, premium payments gradually decrease, so that 
total income does not exceed the limit set by the cap. Beyond this point, producers 
simply receive the spot market price (Klein et al. 2010; Eclareon & Öko-Institut 2012; 
Couture & Gagnon 2010). Apart from the adjustment of premium rates, schemes also 
differ according to degression rules, caps, eligibility periods, and the degree of differen-
tiation between technologies (RES LEGAL 2012). With the exception of Estonia, all 
countries differentiate between RES technology groups when determining premium 
levels; in some cases, the amount paid also depends on the size of installations and other 
characteristics (e.g. use of combined heat and power options) (cf. RES LEGAL 2012).  
 
4.2.2 Impacts on market integration 
An overview of premium designs shows that the instrument is frequently used to 
integrate RES more strongly in the market allocation mechanism than in the German 
model, i.e. market integration in a narrow sense is of higher relevance as a policy objec-
tive (cf. section 2). Fixed premium schemes in particular expose RES producers to con-
siderable price risks, as payments are not adjusted to falling market prices (Eclareon & 
Öko-Institut 2012). But also in the context of sliding premium schemes, producers can 
be exposed to varying degrees of risk: if premium rates are frequently adjusted to actual 
market developments, risks for producers are minimised; if prices are averaged over 
longer periods (e.g. three months in the case of Finland), producers retain a higher risk 
of achieving substandard sales revenues (cf. tab. 4). Meanwhile, in both sliding and 
fixed premium schemes, producers bear higher volume and balancing risks than in feed-
in tariffs; while the latter are usually combined with purchase obligations and TSOs are 
responsible for balancing, premium schemes generally require producers to market their 
electricity and pay for balancing forecasting errors themselves (Klessmann et al. 2008).  
While using the price mechanism to guide production and investment decisions can 
improve the efficiency of electricity supply, several trade-offs arise with other policy 
objectives of RES support. Namely, these are trade-offs between efficiency and incen-
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tives for innovation; efficiency and the cost-effectiveness of support; and efficiency and 
the aim of curtailing market power in the RES sector.  
Efficiency and incentives for innovation: Fixed premium schemes might be seen as 
a Pigovian subsidy compensating for social net benefits but apart from that still main-
taining the competition of technologies. Hence, these schemes are particularly close to 
the market, and favour cost-efficient technology choices. However, when a significant 
share of producers’ revenue is determined by fluctuating market prices, investors may 
be more averse to invest in innovative technologies which are still a long way from be-
coming competitive. For promoting the deployment of innovative technologies, feed-in 
tariffs have the advantage of offering investors high planning certainty (Batlle et al. 
2012). Sliding premium schemes which compensate for the difference between refer-
ence costs and market prices are likewise effective in reducing uncertainty for investors.  
Efficiency and cost-effectiveness of support: If revenues of RES projects are uncer-
tain, the costs of capital increase; therefore, in order to achieve the same effectiveness of 
incentives for RES investment, a premium scheme will require higher support payments 
per kWh than a fixed feed-in tariff (Mitchell 2006; Ragwitz et al. 2007; Klessmann et 
al. 2008; Couture & Gagnon 2010; Klein et al. 2010; Batlle et al. 2012). The greater the 
exposure of producers to market risks in a particular scheme’s design, the more pro-
nounced the necessary increase in support costs will be. Moreover, compared to a FIT 
system, the risk of overcompensation is higher for market premium schemes, because 
total remuneration is more likely to diverge from actual project costs once electricity 
prices influence revenue (Langniß et al. 2009; Mitchell 2006). Introducing price floors 
and caps as practiced by the Spanish model offers advantages in this respect, because 
price risks are limited for producers and society both (Ragwitz et al. 2007; Klein et al. 
2010; Couture & Gagnon 2010). Generally, however, profit margins of plant operators 
are usually higher in premium schemes than under a feed-in tariff (Langniß et al. 2009; 
Mitchell 2006).  
Efficiency and market power: Irrespective of the design variant, premium schemes 
are likely to increase market power, by giving large and vertically integrated utilities a 
competitive advantage over small-scale RES producers (Klessmann et al. 2008; Couture 
& Gagnon 2010; Batlle et al. 2012). Larger utilities can benefit from economies of scale 
in handling the transaction costs of direct marketing, and a diversified plant portfolio 
allows for a pooling of balancing and price risks (Klessmann et al. 2008; Batlle et al. 
2012). Individual producers, on the other hand, have to rely on intermediaries for effec-
tive market participation, who require a share of the profits for their services (Kless-
mann et al. 2008; Batlle et al. 2012).6  
Lastly, there are doubts whether the current marginal cost-based, energy-only 
design of the electricity market is suitable in the long term to integrate large shares of 
                                                 
6  In the Spanish wind power market, this impact on the market structure can already be observed: since 
the premium scheme has replaced feed-in tariffs as the dominant support instrument, incumbent 
generators are responsible for a significantly higher share of new investments than before (Batlle et al. 
2012). 
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RES electricity production (EWI 2012; Kopp et al. 2012; Matthes 2012; Winkler & 
Altmann 2012; Nestle 2011; Klessmann et al. 2008). RES installatons like wind and 
solar power plants can bid into the market with marginal costs close to zero, thereby 
reducing market prices and income for all producers. As a result, market incentives for 
investing in new capacities decline for RES and conventional power producers alike 
(Cramton u. Ockenfels 2012; Matthes 2012). Apart from a fundamental reform of the 
electricity market design, introducing capacity markets may be a possible solution 
which is currently considered by several countries (Winkler u. Altmann 2012; Kopp et 
al. 2012). This discussion, however, places doubts on whether increasing the 
participation of individual RES producers in electricity markets is urgently required, as 
long as the future of the market design itself is unclear. Rather, adjustments to the 
current support regime may increase complexity, impeding later system changes 
(Winkler u. Altmann 2012). 
 
4.2.3 Impacts on system integration 
The larger the share of revenue which is determined by market prices, the stronger 
the incentives for producers to ensure that they can provide electricity when prices are 
high (cf. Ragwitz et al. 2007; Klein et al. 2010; Eclareon & Öko-Institut 2012). Howev-
er, the effectiveness of market signals ultimately depends on producers’ ability to react 
to them (Ragwitz et al. 2007; Klessmann et al. 2008; Batlle et al. 2012). No matter 
which design variant of a premium scheme is chosen, wind energy and PV installations 
will, in the absence of storage systems, continue to feed-in electricity as long as total 
expected remunerations are positive. As the exposure of intermittent RES to market 
risks will nevertheless result in higher risk premiums being demanded for investment, 
and therefore higher support costs, their inclusion in premium schemes is heavily debat-
ed (cf. Klessmann et al. 2008; Hiroux & Saguan 2010; Batlle et al. 2012). Limiting 
premium schemes to dispatchable RES would be an option to capture a significant part 
of the potential system integration benefits while limiting additional costs (Klessmann 
et al. 2008; Consentec & R2B Energy Consulting 2010; Batlle et al. 2012). Incentives 
for intermittent plants to improve maintenance planning, forecasting and balancing 
would be lost, as well as, in the case of wind power plants, the incentive to adapt loca-
tion choices to demand-compatible wind profiles (Hiroux & Saguan 2010). However, 
regulatory alternatives exist, e.g. the introduction of congestion pricing in the calcula-
tion of grid charges, or the setting of incentives for efficient balancing at the level of 
system operators (Klessmann et al. 2008). Here, an additional advantage is that fluctua-
tions of individual plants can be balanced over a wider area (Klessmann et al. 2008), 
and that an optimisation between grid extension, storage investments, and demand-side 
management would be possible (cf. Nykamp et al. 2012). Moreover, investments in 
storage systems are generally considered to be more efficient on system level than on 
the level of individual plants (cf. Matthes 2012; Gatzen & Riechmann 2011; Nestle 
2011). It may therefore be advantageous to improve the market and system integration 
of intermittent RES first of all on the level of transmission system operators, who in 
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Germany are responsible for marketing electricity under the feed-in tariff and maintain-
ing grid stability (cf. Klessmann et al. 2008).  
 
5 Conclusions 
Based on this analysis, it seems unlikely that the German market premium scheme 
in its current design can significantly improve the market and system integration of re-
newable energies. While market integration in a narrow sense (i.e. exposing renewables 
to price risks) is not the purpose of the German premium scheme, it has successfully 
increased participation in direct marketing. However, the management premium com-
ponent of the scheme gives rise to large windfall profits, and the benefits of gradually 
leading plant operators towards the market are questionable. In particular, the parallel 
existence of feed-in tariffs and premium scheme places doubts on whether the transition 
of plant operators towards direct marketing and changes in production behaviour will be 
permanent. Incentives for demand-oriented electricity production are established, but 
they prove insufficient particularly in the case of intermittent renewable energy sources.  
By allowing market price fluctuations to determine a larger share of producers’ rev-
enues, fixed premium schemes or sliding premium schemes with less frequent adjust-
ments may provide stronger incentives for demand-oriented production compared to the 
German market premium, and promote market integration in a narrow sense. However, 
efficiency gains from exposing RES producers to market risks have to be balanced 
against trade-offs with incentives for innovation, the cost-effectiveness of support, and 
potentially adverse impacts on the market structure of the RES sector. In order to realise 
ambitious RES expansion targets, cost-based, sliding premium schemes with frequent 
adjustments to market price developments seem preferable compared to benefit-based 
fixed premium schemes, because planning certainty for investors remains high. Howev-
er, even if price risks are limited through the scheme’s design, producers have to be 
compensated for higher volume and balancing risks; as a consequence, it can be ex-
pected that support costs will be somewhat higher than in the case of a fixed feed-in 
tariff in combination with purchase guarantees. The challenge of avoiding overcompen-
sation is therefore not specific to the German market premium with its management 
premium, but a common characteristic of premium schemes. 
Whether a sliding premium scheme is preferable to a feed-in tariff, depends ulti-
mately on whether the benefits of enhanced system integration justify the additional 
costs. For intermittent RES, this seems doubtable, because the limited possibilities of 
wind and PV installations to react to short-term price signals impose fundamental con-
straints on the instrument’s ability to improve their system integration. Rather, systemic 
concepts are required, which draw on all components of the energy system for address-
ing the challenge of system integration. For dispatchable RES, a sliding premium 
scheme could be a promising part of such an integrated concept, as long as it provides 
effective incentives for demand-oriented production without overly increasing market 
risks and impeding market access for small RES producers. In the German market pre-
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mium scheme, planning certainty remains high; whether incentives are sufficient to en-
courage demand-oriented production and investments in flexible plant designs remains 
to be confirmed empirically. However, a premium scheme for dispatchable RES needs 
to be complemented by incentives for investments in storage systems, energy efficiency 
and demand-side management. In the case of intermittent RES, it seems advantageous 
to promote system integration first at the level of transmission system operators. Mean-
while, increasing the market integration of RES (in a narrow sense) is not recommenda-
ble, as long as grid parity has not been established and there are doubts whether the cur-
rent electricity market design is suitable at all for integrating large shares of RES. In 
order to limit uncertainty about future framework conditions, a timely and transparent 
discussion of fundamental alternatives would be desirable, as well as the development 
of concepts which take all relevant aspects of the electricity system into account.  
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